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Mystery and Problem in the Thought
of Gabriel Marcel
Ronald 1. Pratt

In the introduction to The Mystery of Being Marcel describes his philosophical
reflection as a journey and extends an invitation to those who wish to follow him
along the path of his reflection. He tells them that it is his intention to "seek again
the essence of a spiritual reality."l In focussing their attention upon this, Marcel is
inviting them to share an experience in which the world and their very selves are
seen in a new light. It is his invitation to experience the dimension of mystery in
things and so move beyond a problematic view. In the development of this experience of mystery, as opposed to problem, there is a twofold level: 1) mystery and
problem as modes of knowing, and 2) mystery and problem as modes of existing.
It will be our intention in the course of this paper to emphasize mystery and problem as modes of existing and only briefly consider them as modes of knowing. We
also wish to delineate what is a further dual aspect in mystery and problem as
modes of existing. There is a pre-reflective, or pre-ontological, and a reflective, or
ontological aspect. Although Marcel does not explicit ely consider this distinction in
his work, there appear to be sufficient reasons for affirming it. Briefly, we may
consider the pre-reflective to be the given, in a sense an a priori, from which one
determines his being, while the reflective designates in what way this determining
should occur. We shall now consider mystery and problem as modes of knowing
and subsequently as modes of existing.
When Marcel speaks of reflection he conceives it to have a twofold function:
1) as it enables one to submit an object to analysis and so reduce it to its parts, and
2) as it enables one to re-establish into a totality what was analyzed. 2 He calls
them a First, or analytic, Reflection and a Second, or integrative, Reflection. He relates them to mystery and problem in that mystery describes an integrative view of
things, while problem is analytic. Marcel writes:
The distinction of the mysterious and the problematic. The problem is
that which one encounters, which stands in the way. It is entirely before
me. On the other hand, the mysterious is where I find myself engaged, the
essence of which is not to be entirely before me. It is as if in this sphere
the distinction of in me (en moil and before me (devant moil lose their
meaning. 3
In the contrast between the "in me" and the "before me", when he speaks of the
problematic consciousness as "before me" he is imaging it as a visual conscious-
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ness. The problematic object is, so to speak, projected in front of the self and so is
open to a visual gaze whereby it can be reduced to a sum-total of its parts. Concomitant with this visual imagery, there is also a sense of distance between the
conscious self and this object. Mystery, on the other hand, is not imaged in this way.
Marcel insists, rather, upon an auditory image of consciousness. There is neither a
sense of projection nor of distance which accompanies this image. With mystery
there is a sense of connaturality, or even of intimacy, between the conscious self
and its object.
This sense of distance which accompanies the problematic consciousness equally
implies that the knower does not enter into the cognitive relation as a dimension of
the object. What is meant here is that the knower can assume the position of an
observer, or spectator, and realize that what he proposes regarding the object does
not involve him. As Marcel conceives it this is the precise characteristic of a science. 4 The physicist, for example, in conducting experiments acknowledges that the
object of his experiment is wholly extrinsic to him. Marcel is not saying that what
discoveries may be made in a science have no application to the observing scientist.
If a scientist should discover a new toxic agent, he realizes that he would die if exposed to it because he is subject to the physical laws involved. But his very self is
not the precise object of reflection, so he can conceive the object as wholly other,
as projected before him. Moreover, to the degree that the object can be conceived
as other, so it can be enfolded in a conceptual system.
This problematic mode of cognition is especially true of a technological knowledge. For Marcel technology is essentially a know-how. It is a form of knowing
whereby man can manipulate things to achieve some end or purpose, which end he
imposes upon them. It assures man of a dominance over things.
By technique, I will mean, generally, every discipline tending to assure man
of a mastery over a determined object; and it is evident that every technique can be considered to be a manipulation, a means of handling or of
working a certain material which (material) can also be purely ideal (as a
technique of history or of psychology).5
To be as precise as possible, a technology possesses three characteristics: 1) it is
rational; 2) it is a procedure; and 3) it is manipulative. In assessing a technology to
be such, Marcel also contends that it has value only as a means; as a procedure it
is a means to an end.
There is no question of condemning techniques as such because precisely
where they fulfill their function they do not partake of an in se (in itself),
techniques, are not an in se. Techniques are not given this kind of primacy
in relation to a thought concerned with being, and not with doing. 6
Although Marcel does not disparage the need for a technological knowing, he is
concerned with its limited perspectives. As concerned with doing, and not with
being, technology sees the world to be intelligible solely as a means and unable to
possess the intelligibility, and value, of an end. It is his intent that the integrative
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view of mystery should act as a counter-balance, because he fears that a technology
threatens to become the exclusive view of things.
To sum up for the moment, we have seen the problematic view of things to be
analytic and as such a means of objectifying things and reducing them to a conceptual system. On the other hand, the integrative view of mystery evokes a connaturality which sees things in their wholeness and, in contrast to a technology,
sees them as ends-in-themselves. For Marcel it is the thrust of mystery to disclose
the being of things. It is not possible here to consider the whole context in which
Marcel develops this. But suffice it to say that the mystery of being is essentially
the question of the meaning of being, which question is proposed in terms of the
questioner reflecting upon himself. It is in reflecting upon himself as embodied that
is disclosed what Marcel calls the "existential mark" [le rep ere existentiel) or existential given. It is from the facticity of embodiment that the pre-reflective, or preontological, and reflective, or ontological, dimensions of mystery as a mode of existing are developed. Moreover, it is from the facticity of embodiment that Marcel's
concrete empiricism evolves.
Marcel's reflections upon embodiment are concerned initially with the question
of a dualism in which the body is conceived to be an instrument of the self. In this
sense the self cannot be conceived to be embodied but is a kind of entity using a
body. Marcel's argument against this form of dualism begins with his definition of
an instrument. He proposes that "it is evident that every instrument is an artificial
means of extending, of developing and reinforcing a pre-existent power which he,
who uses the instrument, must possess."7 For example, one must already have the
power of sight before he can use a microscope because without this power the
microscope is useless. Similarly, to conceive of the body as an instrument is to
presume the prior possession of a bodily power which can use it because the
instrument-body is simply an extension of this power. Marcel contends that this
involves an infinite regress. Since the instrument-body is the extension of a bodily
power, then the question must be asked what is the relationship between this
bodily power and the self? And to consider it to be instrumental presumes again the
prior existence of a bodily power and so on to infinity.s Instrumentalism does not
provide any response to the mystery of embodiment; it merely reduces it to a problem. And because there is the implied infinite regress, then this problematic interpretation is untenable.
Marcel arrives at a similar conclusion in his interpretation of sensation. He contends that an instrument-body cannot be the focal point of a sense experience. He
asserts this position because he believes that it reduces sensation to a stimulusresponse relationship. The instrument-body is similar to an organism which responds only to stimuli that are physically received. Marcel sees a major difficulty
with this position. He believes that it assumes the difficulty of a "mirror-consciousness". It is as though the stimuli which are received are representations of the thing
affecting consciousness and it is these mirror images which are experienced. This
necessitates a standing outside of consciousness because only by doing so can one
compare the mirror images and the thing.9
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He elaborates this further when he rejects the position that sensation is a transmission of messages. What is assumed is that sensation occurs between two communication centers, one a transmitter and the other a receiver. Because there is a
distance which separates them, it is assumed that sensation must be the transmission of some message.lO Dependent upon whether one advocates a panpsychism or
not, either one or both communication centers is said to be conscious. To advocate
that only one is conscious is to begin with a heterogeneity, while a panpsychism
assumes a homogeneity. Marcel believes that both these positions face the same
difficulty in that the reception of a material datum demands a translation, or a decoding, in order for a sense experience to occur. He points out that "by definition,
to translate means to substitute one type of data for another type of data, and for a
translation to be possible these data must in some degree be an object for the
mind."!! This is obviously recognized in the position which holds for a fundamental heterogeneity between transmitter and receiver. What is received as a
purely physical datum, a stimulus, must be re-interpreted into a different kind of
datum, namely, a meaningful sense datum. The precise difficulty is the substitution
of a meaningful datum for a physical particle.!2 How this is accomplished is a
problem that this position must resolve.
The problem of a translation is also a difficulty for the position which assumes a
homogeneity between transmitter and receiver. The difficulty here lies in the assumption that the datum is a sign, a carrier of meaning. This demands that the
receiver be prepared to accept the sign and recognize its meaning. Without this predisposition on the part of the receiver a sense experience is impossible. This predisposition is the ability to decode or to interpret since the sign, as such, does not
refer to itself but refers to another. There are two difficulties which Marcel sees in
this position. First, that a datum is conceived to be purely material, based on the
belief that sensation takes place through a distance. Secondly, that to conceive this
spatial transmission to be that of a sign is to assume a prior knowledge whereby the
receiver is able to interpret the meaning of the sign.J3
As Marcel sees it, the dualism assumed in these positions, that a sensing self
uses a body instrument, leads him to reject them. In effect. he believes that sensation which is a mystery has been reduced to a problem. What necessitates an integral wholeness on the part of the embodied-sensing-self has been destroyed by
the reduction of sensation to a transmission of messages. It is only on the pre-condition of this embodied unity that a sense experience is possible.
Sensation, however, must be viewed differently. It must not be conceived in
terms of data and receptivity of data but must denote a certain experience. Perhaps
it may be better to speak of this as an affective experience rather than a sense
experience. In interpreting sensation to be a receiving, Marcel considers it important not to confuse recptivity and passivity. He believes that an empiricist position
has identified the two in that to receive is to be passive as the wax is passive in
acquiring the imprint of the ring.!4 For Marcel sensation is not a submission to a
physical impression. Rather it is a responding insofar as one is in act to respond.
He proposes as a principle that "one cannot speak of a reception and consequently
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of a receptivity except as a function of a certain pre-affection or pre-ordination."15
It is precisely that the knower receives within himself that which he accepts, and
his acceptance is determined by an active orienting of himself towards the sensed
object. 16
Perhaps this can be clarified by considering Marcel's example of the peasant's
attachment to the land. The peasant sees the land as something that he has worked
for years. At times it produced an abundance and at times was a source of famine.
It is not without significance that we say a peasant has a "feeling" for the land and
that this "feeling" is not readily shared by others. It may be said that this feeling
was formed by his active responding to the land. It is in this sense that Marcel's
appreciation of the sense experience leads him to insist that it is not reducible to a
mere reception of data but constitutes a living encounter with the concrete real.
It is the embodied self as one which mediates its own relationship to the sensed
object. And it is in the pre-condition of this unitive mediation that a concrete affective encounter is possible. In this mediation the knower illuminates his world and
is able to disclose its intelligibility.J7 To foreclose on this illumination is to render
the world unknowable . From this brief discussion of sensation the importance of
the pre-reflective cannot be denied. Because the sense experience is a living affective encounter then this pre-reflective unity is the condition from which man creatively constitutes an intelligible world.
However, the concept of embodiment must be extended. As embodied man is not
only a physical organism; he is also a spatially and temporally structured being. He
is essentially a being-in-the-world and so embodies himself. As such he embodies,
or concretizes, himself in a social context. And for Marcel this is the context of a
technological society.
In fact it is from an initial reflection upon man in a technological society that
Marcel develops his metaphysics. And we see raised here again the issue of man's
unity. It is as though a technological society seeks to reinstate a dualistic view of
man which dualism denies to him a truly viable human action-much as an instrumentalist concept of sensation sought to destroy the affective sense experience.
This aspect of a technological society again affects man on both the pre-reflective
and reflective levels . It is possible to understand this if one keeps in mind that being, for Marcel, is fundamentally participative. It is the kind of participation which
characterises a technological society that Marcel opposes. He believes that it implies a togetherness as opposed to a community and the manner in which this togetherness is sustained renders a viable human action questionable.
Generally, one considers the term participation to indicate a sharing-in by which
an individual effects a relationship with someone or some group. A child, for example, is said to participate in a game when he joins a group and in so doing creates
a relationship with the other members of the group. In participating he adds his
talents to the group so that they may act co-operatively and perhaps win. He gives
himself, so to speak, to the group; yet, paradoxically, he also takes from it in that
he benefits from this association. His benefits may be physical or psychological,
but there is a sense of achievement or accomplishment which results from his ac-
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tivity. In a sense, the cooperative relationship which is the consequence of their
mutual activity gives to the individual not only a sense of me, but, more profoundly,
a sense of us. This is what Marcel has in mind when he posits that esse est coesse;
being is centered not upon me, but upon us
With me: let us note here the metaphysical value of this word with, which
has been so rarely recognized by philosophers and which corresponds
neither to a relation of inherence or immanence nor to a relation of exteriority. It will be essentially-I am obliged to use a latin word here-an
authentic coesse, that is, a real intimacy which can be destroyed by a critical reflection; but we already know that there is another reflection, bearing upon this (critical) reflection, which refers to an underlying blind, but
effective, intuition and which submits to its secret magnetism.1 8
It is Marcel's conviction that the sense of us which characterises a technological

society is radically different from the participative us of community. He sees this
in terms of the image of man which dominates a technological society. It is man as
a productive center. Community, on the other hand, views man as a creative center.
In this conception of man a technological society views him fundamentally as a
worker, a homo faber. 19 The activity of work becomes not only the center of his
life, but is also the criterion used to judge his worth. Man, in effect, is identified
solely with his work-activity and his value as a human being is judged in terms of
his productive capacity. As productivity is the only measure of value, Marcel contends that it is a value which lies essentially outside of man. It is in terms of this
purely extrinsic value criterion that Marcel's repeated use of the example of the
artist becomes significant. From the viewpoint of a technological society the artist
is usually considered to be an anomaly. He is different from the mass of people in
that his work, and sometimes his appearance, presents a jarring contrast to them
and to their presuppositions. His difference lies basically in his refusal to accept
society's norms without a critical evaluation and this is evident is the divergent
views that each has of the work of art. For Marcel the artist is one who creates a
work of art because he believes it to be an expression of beauty and thus carries
within itself its own value and does not have a value placed upon it. A technological society, on the other hand, tends to view the work of art in terms of its monetary worth thus using an extrinsic criterion to judge its value. Marcel sees this as a
pejorative influence of our society and finds this to be a positive detriment to both
the artist and his work especially when the artist capitulates and commercializes
his work. He finds this to be destructive of the very being of the artist because as
society negates the intrinsic value of the work of art so it also negates the intrinsic
value of the artist. His work of art is no longer a creative manifestation of himself
but is a production dominated by and geared to the commercial interests of society.
What this means for Marcel is that the sense of accomplishment which satisfies the
creative artistic need is frustrated when the artist finds himself dominated by commercial interests. In effect, it is the conflict between man as a creative center and
as a productive center.
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In Marcel's view an object-nature is being imposed upon man. This object-nature
is man conceived to be a homo faber. Subsequently, it is the elevation of one dimension of man, namely his work-activity, to the position of dominating the whole man.
Its importance lies in the fact that it forms the axis around which man determines
the meaningfulness of his whole life. Socially, it is man's reduction to a class role
and the implied principle that all of his relationships are functional. This functional
aspect is especially true of the work-activity when it is organized with the rationale
of maximum efficiency in mind. In terms of efficiency it must be organized and the
position of the worker within the organization is fundamentally that of a part within
a mechanized whole. In the analogy of the machine his being is solely that of a
cog whose spatial position within the whole is that of a fragmented part. And the
part of the machine has no cognizance either of itself as a part or of the whole to
which it belongs. In effect, since it is simply a fragmented part that has no intrinsic relation with the whole as such then it is impossible for it to recognize the
whole. This is the sense of togetherness which characterises the being-with of a
technological society. Man can only embody himself instrumentally since his value
to the society is judged in terms of his worth as a means.
The participative being-with of community, however, rests upon a radically different image of man. It is precisely man as a creative center; man as he freely constitutes his selfhood from within himself. Because of the scope of this paper it is
impossible to develop this at great length. But Marcel sees this creativity to be possible in the acts of fidelity, love and hope. In these acts man effects a relationship
in which he is aware both of himself as unique within a community of other selves
and of the community as a whole which permeates him. He views this community
as a reality which envelops him not in the sense of usurping his uniqueness but,
rather, in the sense of grounding it. He is not a fragmented part of a whole; his
being-with is not an organized togetherness in terms of his identification with a
social function. Rather, fidelity, love and hope are acts whereby man re-collects
himself, affirms himself interiorly as a person and simultaneously witnesses to the
person of another. In fidelity, love and hope one can only intend the person of
another. Because, as Marcel sees them, these acts are fundamentally volitional and
necessitate a response on the part of another. To deny this reciprocal character of
the acts is to deny the acts themselves. Thus, they are essentially participative acts
in which it is not the sense of I-alone which emerges but the sense of us. We are in
that community which guards us as persons.
From the pre-reflective view, the participative being-with assures man in his
historical being of the possibility of freely constituting himself as a person. It does
not close this off from him by imposing an extrinsic category upon him. Moreover,
this being-with not only assures him of this possibility, but also provides the very
relationship in which this is fulfilled . In terms of mystery as an integrative act man's
wholeness is confirmed in this being-with. As such it stands both as a counterbalance and an antithesis to the problematic view of a technological society which
sees man in terms of a part, his work-activity, and imposes this upon the whole of
man. In mystery man is simply permitted to be.
John Carroll U ni versity
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FOOTNOTES
1

Gabriel Marcel, L e mystere de !'etre (Paris: Aubier, 1951) , I, p. 8.

2

"C'est ainsi que Ie role de la rMlex ion-qu'elle s'exerce sur Ie sentir ou sur l'agir---consiste
non point a marceler, a demembrer, m ais, tout au contraire, a retablir dans sa continuite Ie
tissue vivante qu'une analysis imprudent avait desjoint." Gabriel Marcel , JOllrnaL metaphysique (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1927) , p. 324. It is later in Th e Mystery 0/ Being
that he speaks of them as First and Second reflection . Cf. L e myst~re de Ntre, I, p . 107.

3

" Distinction du m ysterieux et du problematique. Le probleme est quelque chose qu 'on
rencontre, que barre la route. II est tout entier devant moi . Au contra ire Ie mystere est
quelque chose ou je me trouve engage, dont I'essence est par consequent de n'etre pas tout
entier deva nt moi. C'est comme si dans cette zone la distinction de l'en moi et du devant
moi perd ait sa signification." Gabriel Marcel, Etre et avoir ( Paris: Aubier, 1935) , p. 145 .
Cf. Position et approches concretes du m ystere ontologique (Louvain: E. N auwaelaerts,
1. Vrin, 1949) , p. 58; Le mystere de {'etre, I, p. 227; Les homm es contre {,hllmain (Paris:
La Colombe, 1951) , pp. 68-69.

4

Gabriel Marcel , JOllrnal metaphysiqlle, p. 97; Dil re/lis
1940), p. 31.

5

"Par technique, j'entendrai, d'une fa~on genera Ie, toute discipline tend ant a assurer a l'homme
la maitrise d'un object determine; et il est bien evident que toute technique peut etre
consideree comme une manipulation, comme un moyen de brasser ou de trava iller une
certaine matiere qui peut d'allieurs etre elle-meme purement ideale (technique de l'histoire
ou de la psychologie) ." Gabriel Marcel, Etre et avoir, p. 271. Cf. Les hommes contre
{,hllmain , p. 63.

6

"11 ne saurait etre question, encore une fois, d'incriminer les techniques prises en ellesmemes, justement parceque la ou elles remplissent exactements leurs fonctions elles n'ont
p as d'en-soi, elles ne sont pas en-soi; il en va tout autrement a partir du moment ou elles
revendiquent une sorte de primaute par rapport a une pen see qui se concentre sur l'etre et
non pas sur Ie faire ." Gabriel Marcel , Les hommes contre {,hllmain , pp. 70-71.

7

'II est evident que tout instrument est un moyen artificiel d'entendre, de developper ou de
renforcer un pouvoir preexistant que doit posseder celui qui use de cet instrument." Gabriel
Marcel, Le mystere de {'~tre , I, p. 115 .

8

Ibid. , pp . 115-16.

9

Ibid., pp. 59-60.

a {'invocation

(Paris: Gallimard,

10

Gabriel Marcel , JOllma l metaphysique, pp . 185, 317; L e mystere de tetre , T, p. 121.

II

"Traduire, remarquons-Ie, c'est, par definition , substituer un certain type de donnees a un
au tre type de donnees, et nous pouvons meme ajouter que ces donnees, pour qui la
trad uction soit possible, doivent a quelque degre etre objet pour I'esprit." Ibid., p. 318; Le
mystere de {' etre, I, p. 123 .

12

Ibid., pp . 269-270; 317-18; Le mystere de /'et re, T, p. 123.

13

I bid.; Le mystere de tetre, I, p. 124.
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14

15

"Contrairement a ce qu'a admis et si longtemps un empiricisme materialiste, sentir ce n'est
pas subir, c'est seulement recevoir mais a la condition expresse qu'on restitue a ce mot
un valeur positive dont on l'a generalement prive. J'ai eu sou vent I'occasion de Ie faire
remarquer, il semble que Kant se soit rendu coupable d'une confusion en admettant sans
discussion que la receptivite etait une passiv ite. Justement il n'en est rien sauf dans la cas
limite auquel I'empiricisme du XVIIIe siecle se referait si volontiers, celui d'un eire qui
recoit une empriente." Gabriel Marcell, Le mystere de /'etre, T, p. 134.
"Je poserai en principe, ai-je ecrit ailIeurs, qu'on ne peut parler de reception et par consequent
de receptivite qu'en fonction d'une preeffcctation ou preordination ." Ibid. Cf. Du reills
['invocation, p. 120. Marcel clarifies what he means by an example. Although it appears
earlier in Th e Mystery 01 Beillg, it is applicable. ·'Une exemple typique d'experience prise
aussi dans un sens etroit serait celui d'un saveur, I'experience apparaissant comme liee a
la presence de quelque chose a moi-meme en moi-meme, et etant intepretee comme l'acte de
se replier sur ce quelque chose. M ais il est evident que ce repliement n'est pas liee a
I'experience comme telle, et que dans d'autres cas, faire I'experience de, c'est d'abord se
tendre vers, comme par exemple lorsque nous cherchons a percevoir distinctement un bruit
lointain la nuit." Ibid. , p. 55.

a

d'au tre part si recevoir, c'est recevoir chez moi, iI suit de la que c'est en quelque
fa<;on accueilIir--et ceci est un acte. Le terme de responsivite est peut-etre celui qui
traduirait de la fa<;on la moins inexacte I'activite qui est ici en question; celle-ci s'oppose a
l'inertie interieure qui est insensibilite ou apathie." Ibid. , p. 135; Dli reills a i'invocation,
pp. 41 , 123 .

16 " Mais

17

Gabriel Marcel, Le m ystere de l'etre, T, pp. 74, 76, 79-80; DlI relus a l'invocation, pp. 43-44.
In The Mystery 01 Being Marcel quotes from Heidegger's On th e Essence 01 Truth. While
Heidegger is concerned here with the question of truth and the judgment upon which it is
established, the quotation does illuminate Marcel's position on the role of the subject in
cognition. " L'essence de cette relation (that of truth) est ce qu'il appelle I'appresentation .
Appresenter, c'est 'Iaisser surgir devant nous la chose en tant que tel objet, rna is de telle
maniere que Ie jugement se laisse conduire par la chose et I'exprime telle qu'elle est present.
La condition de toute appresentation veut que l'etant appresentant se trouve place au sein
d'une lumiere telle que quelque chose puisse lui apparaitre, lui etre rendu manifeste. Ce
quelque chose doit mesurer ou traverser un domain ouvert a notre recontre.''' Le m ystere
de i'etre, I, p. 83. Cf. Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," Existence and Being,
trans. R. F. C. Hull and Alan Crick, ed. Werner Brock (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.,
Gateway Edition, 1962), pp. 300-301.

18

"A vec moi: notons ici la valeur metaphysique de ce mot avec, qui a ete si rarement reconnue par les philosophes et qui ne correspond ni a une rel ation d'inherence ou d'immanence,
ni a une relation d'exteriorite. II sera de I'essence-je suis oblige d'adopter iei Ie mot latind'un coesse authentique, c'est-a-dire, d'une intirnite reele de se preter a la decomposition
que lui fait subir la rUlexion critique; rna is nous savons deja qu 'il est une autre rMlexion,
une rMlexion portant sur cette rMlexion meme, et qui se rMere a une intuition sous-jacente
aveuglee mais efficace et dont elle subit Ie magnetisme secret." Gabriel Marcel, Position et
approches concretes du mystere ontologiqlle, p. 82. Cf. Journal metaphysique, p. 169 ; Dli
reills a l'il1vocatiol1, pp. 120ff; Le mystere de tetre, II, pp. 12ff.

19

Marcel does not use explicitly the term homo laber but he does insist on the identification
of man with a technical, or machine, process, thus making it an anthropological concept.
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He writes. "Pour Ie comprendre nous n'avons, qu'a fermer cette longue parenthese et a
prolonger ce qui a ete dit de la fonction et du rendement. Tout montre que, dans ce qu'on
appelle pretentieusement la civilisation presente, c'est, comme je l'ai indique tout a l'heure
a propos d'un cas particulier, I'homme dont Ie rendement est objectivement discernable qui
est pris comme arch type; c'est-a-dire, remarquons-Ie bien, l'homme qui se trouve par son
type d'activite etre Ie plus directement assimilable a une machine." Les hommes contre
l'humain, pp. 133-34; also pp. 13lff. It is Hannah Arendt who uses the term homo faber
and sees it as the historical cause of the inversion of ends and means. She writes. "Man, in
so far as he is homo faber, instrumentalizes, and his instrumentalization implies a degradation of all things into means, their loss of intrinsic and independent value, so that eventually
not only the objects of fabrication but also 'the earth in general and all forces of nature',
which clearly come into being without the help of man and have an existence independent
of the human world, lose their value because (they) do not present the reification which
comes from work . . . . The issue at stake is, of course, not instrumentality, the use of
means to achieve an end, as such, but rather the generalization of the fabrication experience
in which usefulness and utility are established as the ultimate standards for life and the
world of men." Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday
and Co., Inc., 1959), p. 137; also pp. 125-26, 133, 135-36. It is because Marcel and Arendt
agree on this point that we use the term homo faber above.
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